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STUDENTS AND WORKERS AND PRISONERs-OH, MY! 
A CAUTIONARY NOTE ABOUT EXCESSIVE INSTITUTIONAL 
TAILORING OF FIRST AMENDMENT OOCfRINE 
* Scott A. Moss 
First Amendment free speech doctrine has been caUed "institutionally oblivious" 
for ignoring how different institutions present different legal questions. This 
Article analyzes a little-discussed phenomenon in the growing literature about 
institutional context in constitutional law. With certain institutions, the situation 
is not institutional obliviousness but the opposite: extreme institutional tailoring 
of speech doctrine. The burden of proof ordinarily is on the government to justify 
speech restrictions, but in three institutions-public schools, workplaces, and 
prisons-courts allow heavy speech restrictions and defer to government officials. 
Even if these institutions need to restrict speech unusually often, why do we need 
different doctrine-institutionally tailored government-deferential standards-
rather than standard heightened scrutiny? Courts have given no real answer. 
This Article serves three purposes. First, it attempts a descriptive analysis of 
why courts might perceive a need to tailor doctrine to these institutions. The two 
main arguments are waiver and risk. The waiver argument is straightforward. 
Individuals in certain institutions made a free, ex ante choice to enter a setting 
with restrictive rules. The risk argument is somewhat more involved. Heightened 
scrutiny, by declaring speech restrictions presumptively invalid, risks erroneously 
allowing dangerous speech in institutions in which there is both high error cost 
and high error probability. Error cost is high if a court erroneously allows 
disruptive speech in, for example, a prison prone to riots. Error probability is 
high because in these complex institutions, information costs are high for courts 
(so courts should defer to institutional judgments) and speech restrictions are 
warranted more often (so even a modest rate of error can yield a high number of 
errors). This risk analysis suggests that economics can help analyze constitu-
tional issues involving risk and error cost and probability. 
Second, this Article undertakes a critical analysis of the above arguments for 
institutional tailoring, finding several flawed or overstated. The waiver argument 
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contravenes precedent (and so cannot be courts' actual reason) and is based on 
exaggerated premises of free choice and foreseeable consequences. The error cost 
point is exaggerated because the government can often guard against harmful 
speech with monitoring rather than a ban. The error probability argument assumes 
high information costs of courts evaluating these institutions, yet courts regularly 
handle cases in more complex institutions. The waiver and risk arguments are 
exaggerated but not wholly unfounded. Both are stronger for prisons; and the 
waiver argument is stronger for workplaces than schools. This Article offers a 
typology of the strength of the waiver and risk arguments in each institution. 
Third, this Article proposes that speech law, like equal protection law, apply 
heightened scrutiny in all institutions, though with modest tailoring. Considering 
institutional context is good in moderation, bad in excess. By dividing speech 
rights so starkly by institution, courts have not recognized, but rather overstated, 
the uniqueness of schools, workplaces, and prisons-and allowed more speech 
restriction than is justified. This risk of exaggerating uniqueness is inherent to 
tailoring and should give courts fXluse before tailoring constitutional law. This Article 
concludes with a pragmatic proposal to scale back the tailoring of speech doctrine: 
Courts should apply intermediate scrutiny to speech claims in these institutions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Any law as general as the freedom of speech clause of the First 
Amendment must be subdivided into categories. It must make distinctions 
between what speech is and is not protected, whether by subject matter 
(such as commercial versus noncommercial;1 obscenity or pomography2), by 
medium (broadcast or print3), by institutional context,4 or by some other 
criteria.5 Yet, courts have not given much of a coherent account of whether, 
and to what extent, speech rights should vary by the institutional context 
of the speech. Frederick Schauer has noted and criticized an apparent 
1. Compare, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of 
Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976) (arguing for less protection for commercial speech because 
it is unrelated to self-governance), with Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial 
Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2000) (arguing to the contrary because commercial speech 
is informational). 
2. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002) ("[P]omography can be 
banned only if obscene .... "); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) ("[O]bscenity is not 
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press."). Many criticize the denial of 
constitutional protection to sexual or hateful speech. See, e.g., Amy Adler, What's Left?: Hate 
Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for Artistic Expression, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1499, 1507 (1996) 
("[T]here is no way to draw a principled distinction between 'art' and 'pornography,' or 'art' and 
'hate speech' .... "). 
3. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
§ 11.6.2.4 (3d ed. 2006) ("Can the government require that the media make newspaper space or 
broadcast time available to respond to personal attacks? ... Right to reply laws are allowed as to 
broadcast media, but not the print media."). 
4. See Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 
1256 (2005). 
5. See generally id. at 1256-64 (discussing the range of possible breakdowns of speech protections). 
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"general presumption that First Amendment rights do not vary substantially 
with institutional setting"6: 
[H)aving created the test for obscenity in the context of sales of 
printed materials by mail, the [U.S. Supreme] Court ... appl[ies] the 
same line between the impermissibly obscene and the permissibly 
sexually explicit to outdoor theaters, to dial-a-porn telephone services, 
to cable and satellite television, and to the Internet .... 
7 
That the Court is "institutionally oblivious,''8 Schauer argues, has "distorted 
doctrine and underprotect[ed]"9 speech, because by failing to account for 
institutional context, the Court has "overlooked important ... differences"10: 
A Court that believes it must apply the same ... grounds of offensive 
content to both broadcast television and Bob's XXX Adult 
Bookstore and Peepshow is, in reality, much more likely to allow 
less for Bob than it is to permit virtually everything for CBS during 
. . ll 
pnme ttme .... 
Schauer has been the most persistent critic of "institutionally oblivious" 
constitutional doctrine, but others similarly have criticized courts' failure to 
admit that they scrutinize state programs more closely than federal ones 
("vertical" tailoring) 12 and failure to recognize particular needs to protect 
"First Amendment institutions" like libraries, universities, religious associa-
. d h 13 uons, an t e press. 
The main institutions Schauer discusses are media types (such as blogs 
versus newspapers), means of communication {Internet, broadcast, and 
print), and governmental institutions' own speech activities (administering 
6. Id. at 1263. 
7. Id. at 1261--62 ("[B]roadcasting and ... zoning of adult establishments [are) the only 
significant exceptions." (footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 1262 ("[T)he Court conceptualized the 
library as ... a purchaser of books ... the same conceptual hopper as the government providers of 
health care ... government employers ... [and] government funders of art .... " (emphasis added) 
(footnotes omitted)). 
8. Id. at 1264. 
9. Id. at 1273. 
10. Id. at 1271. 
11. Id. at 1272. 
12. See Adam Winkler, The Federal Government as a Constitutional Niche in Affirmative 
Action Cases, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1931, 1961 (2007). 
13. Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard 
Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497 (2007) [hereinafter Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment 
Institutions); Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 589 (2005) [hereinafter 
Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment]. 
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libraries, arts grants, and political debates). 14 Yet in other institutional con-
texts, the situation is the opposite of institutional obliviousness: Courts 
allow plaintiffs' speech within certain institutions-public schools, 
workplaces, and prisons-to be heavily restricted because it occurs within 
that institution. Whereas Schauer fears underprotection from too little institu-
tional tailoring, in these three contexts, it is courts' extreme institutional 
tailoring that yields underprotection. 
This Article does not quarrel with Schauer's and others' arguments for 
more tailoring as to certain unique institutions, such as government entities 
that engage in or fund speech themselves. Rather, it argues that courts tailor 
too much as to certain other institutions. Courts thus manage the difficult 
feat of succumbing to both Scylla and Charybdis--occasionally veering too 
far in one direction; occasionally veering too far in the other-and thereby 
experience the worst of two opposite paths by not setting a consistent course. 
In student, worker, and prisoner core speech claims--challenges to 
normally forbidden restrictions on controversial speech, email, or expressions 
of grievances--courts do not apply any heightened scrutiny. Unlike in 
most speech cases, the burden of proof is not on the government to justify 
its restrictions of even core speech activities; rather, courts defer substan-
tially to school and prison officials' judgments, and they protect public 
employee speech with a mere balancing test that denies any protection to 
speech that is too job-related or insufficiently a matter of public concern. 
Part I documents this substantial institutional tailoring by the Court. 
Certainly, whereas the government rarely has good reason for 
substantially restricting core speech in public places, it more often will have 
good reason to do so to maintain discipline, mission focus, and order in 
institutions like schools, workplaces, and prisons. But why do courts need 
different speech doctrine--government-deferential tests that are institution-
ally tailored rather than heightened scrutiny-to so acknowledge? While 
courts regularly note the greater need for speech restrictions in such 
institutions, they have not given a coherent account of why institutionally 
tailored doctrine is necessary. 
Part II attempts to discern two reasons that courts might perceive a 
need to tailor doctrine to these institutions. The first is waiver: By entering 
public schools, workplaces, or prisons, individuals waive any objection to 
speech restrictions those institutions impose. The second is that in 
14. Schauer, supra note 4, at 1271-72; Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 1997 
Term-Comment: Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998) 
[hereinafter Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment]. 
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institutions requmng more speech restrictions, heightened scrutiny is ill-
advised, because of the high cost of judicial error (courts disallowing a 
necessary restriction on dangerous prisoners' speech, for example) and the 
high probability of judicial error when courts impose a high burden of 
proof on institutions like schools and prisons whose management involves 
specialized knowledge that is difficult to elaborate dearly in court. The 
latter rationale is an economic risk analysis of error cost and probability. If 
the risk (probability times cost of error) of erroneously allowing harmful 
speech is especially high in certain institutions, then heightened scrutiny 
may be inappropriate. This analysis illustrates how economic theory can 
help analyze constitutional issues that entail analysis of risk. 
Following the above descriptive analysis, Part II undertakes a critical 
analysis, arguing that many of the above reasons for tailoring are based on 
faulty assumptions or are inconsistent with key constitutional principles. 
Even if speech restrictions are warranted more often in certain institutions, 
that alone does not justify departing from heightened scrutiny. Absent any 
other rationales for institution-specific leniency for speech restrictions (that 
is, waiver, information cost, or error cost), the mere fact that the government 
more often should prevail simply means that school, workplace, or prison 
speech restrictions more often will satisfy heightened scrutiny. While many 
aspects of these arguments for tailoring are flawed, some are partly valid as 
to certain institutions. The waiver and risk arguments are strongest for 
prisons; the waiver argument is stronger for workplaces than schools. Part 
II doses with a typology of the strength of each argument in each of the 
three institutions discussed. 
Finally, Part III discusses how speech law could, like equal protection 
law, apply heightened scrutiny to all institutions, with some minimal 
institutional tailoring. A primary objection to rejecting tailoring is that 
without dividing speech law by institution, courts cannot account for 
different effects of speech in different institutions; disruptive speech, for 
example, is especially harmful in schools, workplaces, and prisons. But like 
many things in life, considering institutional context is good in moderation, 
bad in excess. By dividing speech rights so starkly by institutional context, 
courts have not just recognized, but in fact overstated, the uniqueness of 
schools, workplaces, and prisons. Consequently, courts are allowing more 
speech restriction than actually is justified by the nature of those institutions. 
This risk of exaggerating institutional uniqueness is inherent to institu-
tional tailoring and therefore should give courts pause before they tailor 
legal doctrines to particular institutions. Part III concludes with a pragmatic 
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proposal for a small degree of institutional tailoring. Because the arguments in 
favor of tailoring are overstated but not wholly frivolous, courts should apply 
intermediate, not strict, scrutiny to school, workplace, and prison speech claims. 
l. EXTREME INSTITUTIONAL TAILORING: SCHOOLS, WORKPLACES, 
AND PRISONS 
To illustrate the difference that institutional context makes, this 
Article focuses on core speech activities, such as speaking or writing on 
controversial issues or government actions, or exchanging written materials 
such as mail or books. Such activities are largely free from government 
interference when individuals undertake them on private or public property. 
Even on public property, the government lacks the right of a property 
owner: "Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have imme-
morially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, 
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between 
citizens, and discussing public questions."15 With few exceptions, the 
government can impose only reasonable "time, place, and manner" 
restrictions that are content neutral, serve a significant interest, and "leave 
open ample alternative channels" for speech;16 the government cannot bar 
speech from a public space simply on the theory "that it may be exercised 
. h l ~ 7 m some ot er p ace. 
In contrast, when the speaker is a public school student, a government 
employee, or a prisoner, core speech activities may be restricted to a degree 
clearly not permitted for other types of speakers. 
( 1) Public Schools. The Court has allowed content-based restrictions 
on students' speech (at least since the 1980s18 ), including censor-
ing student newspaper articles on pregnancy and divorce
19 
and 
punishing a high school student for a speech with (fairly 
tame) sexual innuendo.20 Most recently, the Court allowed 
punishment of a student for displaying a banner bearing the 
15. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (rejecting the argument 
that the government can restrict speech as the "owner" of public property). 
16. Heffron v. lnt'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981) 
(quoting Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). 
17. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 146, 163 (1939). 
18. The Court in the 1960s and 1970s recognized students' rights to antiwar and antipolice 
expression. See Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (antipolice cartoon); Tinker v. 
Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 ( 1969) (antiwar armbands). 
19. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
20. Bethel Sch. Oist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
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message "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS,"
21 
which the Court admitted 
was "cryptic"22 but nevertheless said was punishable because 
school officials "reasonably viewed [it] as promoting illegal drug 
use"23-a standard that departs markedly from the Court's 
general First Amendment rule that encouragement of lawless-
ness is punishable only if it intends to, and is likely to, incite 
lawless action that is imminent.24 
(2) Public Employment. "A government entity has broader discre-
tion to restrict speech when it acts in its role as employer" in 
that courts analyze public employers' restrictions on employee 
speech not with heightened scrutiny but with a mere balancing 
test--or, when the speech is work-related or not of public 
concern, no protection at all.25 Accordingly, an assistant district 
attorney's complaint about serious prosecutorial misconduct, 
for example, was entirely unprotected against retaliation by his 
public employer.26 
(3) Prisons. "Most regulations of prisoner speech have been 
upheld"27 because courts do not require prison speech restric-
tions to be necessary to compelling or significant interests, just 
"reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."28 The 
Court has upheld substantial restrictions on prisoners' rights to 
send mail to other prisoners,29 to order books,30 and even to 
have any newspapers, magazines, or photographs.31 
21. Morse v. Frederick, No. 06-278, slip op. at 2 (U.S. June 25, 2007). 
22. Id. at 6. 
23. Id. at 8. 
24. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("[T]he constitutional guarantees of 
free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy ... of law violation 
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action."). 
25. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006). See generally Sonja Bice, Tough 
Talk From the Supreme Court on Free Speech: The Illusory Per Se Rule in Garcetti as Further Evidence 
of Connick's Unworkable Employee/Citizen Speech Partition (Marquette Univ. L. Sch., Research 
Paper No. 06-37, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=942684. 
26. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. 1951. 
27. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, § 11.4.4 (collecting cases). 
28. Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 
87 (1987)). 
29. See Turner, 482 U.S. 78 (upholding the rule against prisoners mailing letters to 
prisoners elsewhere). 
30. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (upholding rule against prisoners receiving 
hardcover books other than from publishers or bookstores). 
31. See Beard, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (upholding the rule disallowing newspapers, magazines, or 
photographs to prisoners housed in unit for those who committed misconduct while incarcerated). 
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Such schisms do not exist in all constitutional fields. For example, in 
equal protection doctrine, the same "tiers of scrutiny" analysis applies to all 
matters,32 and the Court has declared strict scrutiny applicable even to claims 
brought by public school students/3 public employees,34 and prisoners.35 
II. WAIVER AND RISK: TWO ARGUMENTS FORT AILORING 
AND THEIR LIMITS 
This Part serves two purposes. First, it attempts to explain why courts 
might perceive a need to tailor doctrine to the above~mentioned institu~ 
tions. Fundamentally, the problem of evaluating speech restrictions is one 
of competing entitlements: the individual's right to speak versus the govern~ 
ment's right (even duty) to perform public functions like operating public 
schools, workplaces, and prisons.36 Even where an individual's entitlements 
merit strong protection, they still can be restricted in certain settings on the 
two main rationales of waiver and risk. 
(1) Waiver. 37 Speech rights are waivable; we can choose, and even 
bind ourselves legally, not to speak. Individuals in certain 
institutions make a free, ex ante choice to enter a setting with 
restrictive rules. Public school students' parents exercise a 
choice among school districts and other options (private 
school or home schooling); public employees accept jobs that 
32. See generally Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection Unmodified: justice john Paul Stevens 
and the Case for Unmediated Constitutional Interpretation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2339, 2342 
(2006) ("[T]he modern three-tiered approach to equal protection review has become more and 
more embedded into the sinews of the law over the last quarter century."). 
33. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003 ); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For further analysis of the applicability of 
strict scrutiny in this context, see infra Part lll.B. 
34. The Supreme Court has not heard a case specifically involving race discrimination 
against a public employee, in part because many public employment cases are cast as statutory 
rather than constitutional discrimination claims. See, e.g., Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 
1552 (3d Cir. 1996). Still, it is well established that "employment practices which discriminate 
on the basis of race are subjected to strict scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause. Jan W. 
Henkel, Discrimination by Supervisors: Personal Liability Under Federal Employment Discrimination 
Statutes, 49 FLA. L. REV. 767, 788 (1997) (collecting cases); see also Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n 
of N.Y. v. City of New York, 310 F.3d 43,52 (2d Cir. 2002); McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 
F.3d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1998). 
35. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005). For further analysis of the 
applicability of strict scrutiny in this context, see infra Part liLA. 
36. Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed's classic article noted how all asserted entitle-
ments compete with a contrary entitlement. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property 
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
37. See Part !LA for a full elaboration of the waiver argument. 
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require them to obey employer-imposed restrictions; and prisoners, 
by committing crimes, force society to house them in prisons 
that require security restrictions. 
(2) Risk of Erroneously Allowing Dangerous Speech. 38 In settings 
requiring more speech restrictions, it may make sense not to 
apply heightened scrutiny to the government. In some settings 
(a) the cost of error is high-if a court erroneously allows 
dangerous speech by a prisoner, for example, deaths or 
riots could result; and 
(b) the probabiUty of error is high with heightened scrutiny because 
( i) information costs are high for courts analyzing 
complex, specialized institutions like schools or 
prisons, so courts should defer to the institutions' 
judgments; and 
(ii) speech restrictions should be allowed more often in 
certain institutions, so even a modest rate of judicial 
error can yield a high number of errors of allowing 
dangerous speech. 
As to the risk analysis, if the risk (probability times cost of error) of 
erroneously allowing harmful speech that warrants restriction is especially 
higher in certain institutions, then it might make sense to relax the 
heightened scrutiny ordinarily applicable to speech restrictions. 
Second, this Part engages in not only the above descriptive analysis 
of how courts might justify institutional tailoring, but also a critical 
analysis finding that many of the reasons for varying speech rights by 
institution are based on faulty assumptions or are inconsistent with key 
constitutional principles. 
• The waiver argument is contrary to much case law (and therefore 
cannot be courts' actual reason) and, more importantly, is based on 
exaggerated premises of free choice and foreseeable implied waiver.39 
• The high error cost point is exaggerated because even if useful 
speech restrictions were disallowed, the government could guard 
against harmful speech by spending more on monitoring 
(inspecting rather than banning mail, for example). While 
preventing serious harm justifies restricting speech, avoiding admin-
istrative costs rarely does.40 
38. See Part II.B.l for a full elaboration of the risk argument. 
39. See infra Part !I.A. 
40. See infra Part II.B.Z.a. 
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• The argument for deference based on probability of error assumes 
that there are high information costs of courts evaluating 
complex institutions like schools, workplaces, and prisons. Yet 
these institutions are not unusually resistant to outside analysis; 
courts regularly evaluate facts, set legal rules, and pass judgment 
in cases involving far more complex contexts.41 
Despite the flaws in the waiver and risk arguments, it probably is true 
that speech restrictions are warranted more often in certain institutions. 
But absent any other rationales for institution-specific leniency for speech 
restrictions, the mere fact that the government more often should prevail 
does not justify a departure from heightened scrutiny; it simply means that 
speech restrictions in schools, workplaces, or prisons more often will satisfy 
heightened scrutiny. 
Ultimately, the waiver and risk arguments are more persuasive in some 
contexts than in others. For example, waiver and risk arguments are stronger 
for prisons than schools or workplaces; the waiver argument is stronger for 
workplaces than schools. Subpart C offers a typology of the strength of each of 
the two arguments in each of the three contexts this Article discusses. 
A. Waiver 
Public schools, employment, and prisons each, to varying extents, 
might be institutional contexts in which individuals, by entering those 
places, waive their speech rights. This argument varies in persuasive power 
in each of these three contexts. This Subpart discusses each in tum. 
1. Public Schools: Choice and Federalism 
The waiver argument seems most persuasive for institutions in which 
speech is restricted as a result of the speaker's choices. Thus, the argument 
seems stronger for prisons (restrictions on autonomy seem necessary to the 
imprisonment that follows a choice to commit a crime) and for workplaces 
(restrictions on autonomy are part of the employment terms an employee 
accepts by taking and keeping a job) than in schools. Yet even the school 
context features an element of choice. Parents of schoolchildren can opt 
out of the public school system entirely, as many do in choosing private 
41. See infra Part II.B.2.b. 
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schools or home schooling.42 Even the vast majority who remain in the 
public school system exercise a choice as well: They choose the school 
district in which they live; essentially, parents choose which local government 
they prefer. 
The waiver argument in the school context thus is essentially a 
federalism argument-that in a system of state sovereignty and local 
control within each state, local governments like school districts should 
have more leeway than the federal government to adopt their own viewpoints 
and select permissible speech. In this vein, some scholars have argued 
that speech rights43 and other constitutional rights44 should apply less 
strictly to state and local governments than to the federal government, in 
part because Americans can more effectively lobby or, by moving, opt out 
of a state or local government restricting their rights than a federal 
government doing so. 
The argument that state or local governments can restrict rights 
more than the federal government, however, has been rejected by the 
Court,45 except as to some of the more technical procedural guarantees in 
42. See generally LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND 
THE LAW 78-85 (2002). 
43. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, Institutional Context in Constitutional Law: A Critical 
Examination of Term Umits, Judicial Campaign Codes, and Anti-Pornography Ordinances, 21 J.L. & 
POL. 223, 246, 249 (2005) ("Permitting localities to regulate such things as pornography would 
have led to a broader array of political communities ... insofar as there would have been 
polities that regulated pornography and others that did not .... [L]ower levels of government 
might be given greater leeway to regulate the content of speech .... "). A state-federal 
distinction has been defended as comporting with the original intent of the framers of the U.S. 
Constitution, who saw the First Amendment's free speech guarantee as a limit on federal power 
that did not infringe upon state sovereignty. See, e.g., William T. Mayton, From a Legacy of 
Suppression to the "Metaphor of the Fourth Estate," 39 STAN. L. REV. 139, 144 (1986) ("[I]n the 
allocation of powers upon which the Constitution was built ... injurious speech was to be 
addressed by the states in the exercise of their residual police power. And that allocation, as 
James Madison explained, 'account[ed] for the policy of binding the hands of the federal government."'). 
44. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional 
Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513 (ZOOS); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the 
Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810 (2004); Christopher Serkin, 
Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1624 (2006) (arguing that the Takings Clause should apply differently to local 
governments than to higher levels of government because local governments are more responsive to 
property owners and more risk averse about avoiding constitutional litigation). 
45. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 4&-49 (1985) (stating that under the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment, it is a "firmly embedded" principle that "States have no greater 
power to restrain the individual freedoms protected by the First Amendment than does the 
Congress"). justice Thomas has argued that the Establishment Clause should apply less strictly 
to state and local government, see Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 677 (2002) 
(Thomas, J., concurring), but thus far to no avail; no other justice, for example, joined his 
Zelman concurrence. 
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the Bill of Rights.46 In the past fifty years, only three Justices have argued that 
speech rights should be lesser at the state and local level: Justices Harlan and 
Jackson in the 1950s,47 and Justice Rehnquist in the 1970s,48 all three in 
opinions that were not joined by any other Justices.49 When it comes to 
individual rights, there is good reason not to defer more to state and local 
46. The Court has relaxed constitutional requirements for state and local governments 
only to the extent that it deems certain rights in the first eight amendments not to be 
"incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on states, on the ground that certain 
rights are insufficiently "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (stating criteria for applying the Bill of Rights guarantees 
to states). Rights in the first eight amendments that apply less or not at all to states typically are 
not core rights like free speech but more technical, procedural rights, the key ones being the right to 
grand jury indictment in criminal cases, see Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), the right 
to a jury in civil cases, see Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916), and 
the right to a unanimous twelve-member criminal jury, see Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 
(1979) (disallowing nonunanimous juries of six, but only after precedents allowing unanimous 
juries of six or nonunanimous juries of twelve). 
47. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503, 506 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) ("I agree with Mr. Justice Jackson that the historical evidence does 
not bear out the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment 'incorporates' the First in any literal 
sense .... (N]o overwhelming danger to our freedom ... is likely to result from the suppression of 
a borderline book in one of the States, so long as there is no uniform nation-wide suppression of 
the book, and so long as other States are free to experiment with the same or bolder books." 
(citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 294-95 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (asserting, as 
to the level of constitutional protection for speech, "[t]he inappropriateness of a single standard 
for restricting State and Nation .... I should not, unless clearly required, confirm to the Federal 
Government such latitude as I think a State reasonably may require for orderly government of its 
manifold concerns. The converse of the proposition is that I would not limit the power of the 
State with the severity appropriately prescribed for federal power"))). 
48. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, i91 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) ("For the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in 
Beauhamais v. IUinois, and by Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in Roth v. United States, 
I am of the opinion that not all of the strictures which the First Amendment imposes upon 
Congress are carried over against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather that it is 
only the 'general principle' of free speech that the latter incorporates." (citations omitted)). 
49. More recently, Justice Stevens has expressed a similar view, opining that local libraries 
can install Internet filters even though the U.S. Congress could not require such filters. 
United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 220-23 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
("[L]ibraries that decided to use such software on all of their Internet terminals ... did not 
act unlawfully. Whether it is constitutional for the Congress of the United States to impose 
that requirement ... however, raises a vastly different question .... [L]ocal decisions tailored 
to local circumstances are more appropriate than a [federal] mandate .... " (internal citations 
omitted)). This is a less clear adoption of the Harlan-Jackson view (which Stevens did not cite) 
than Justice Rehnquist's for two reasons. First, Justice Stevens was not ruling directly on a 
local speech restriction, just opining that it would be better than the federal restriction actually at 
issue in the case. Second, libraries are a somewhat unique type of local government, one that 
necessarily makes its own speech choices in deciding which books to buy, and that arguably has its 
own speech rights, so it is far from clear that Justice Stevens would allow other kinds of local 
governments (such as school districts limiting student speech) to restrict speech more than the 
federal government. See generaUy Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13. 
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governments than to the federal government. Whereas local government 
may be quite responsive to property owner interests,50 it is unlikely to be 
responsive to the interests of minority groups, whether racial, religious, or 
political-as illustrated by the many cases in which the Court has disallowed 
state and local government crackdowns on those with disfavored beliefs or 
practices.
51 
And where responsiveness cannot be assumed, the only 
remaining argument for deferring more to local governments is citizen 
choice-which is the waiver argument, that by choosing to remain in a 
locality, one waives any objection to its rules. 
The "choice" to remain in a locality, however, often is a purely 
formalistic choice; many have no meaningful option to move. Moving 
one's residence not only entails economic costs that some cannot afford 
(transportation and a means to transport all one's belongings), but also 
often means sacrifice to one's career, social network, and family ties; moving 
school-age children entails additional practical difficulty. 
Given the substantial transaction costs52 of moving one's residence, we 
cannot assume that when a town restricts a group's rights, the restriction 
must be socially efficient because the group did not depart en masse. The 
presence of substantial transaction costs means that rational choices may 
not lead to the socially efficient allocation of human or other capital.53 
Still, there is at least a formal choice to remain in a state or locality that 
restricts one's rights, so courts' rejection of the idea that states and localities 
have more power to restrict rights is an implicit rejection of the idea that 
unrealistic, formal choice is a basis for allowing restrictions of fundamental 
rights. The rest of this Subpart proceeds on this principle: that for any 
waiver argument to hold water, it must be based on a realistic conception 
of choice, not a merely formal one. 
50. See Serkin, supra note 44. 
51. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (overturning a city ordinance against 
only those fighting words with certain discriminatory content); Texas v. Jolmson, 491 U.S. 397 
(1989) (overturning a state law against flag burning); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,462 (1987) 
(overturning a city ordinance that "prohibits speech that in any manner ... interrupt[s] an 
officer"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (overturning a state prosecution for profanity in 
the courthouse). 
52. "Transaction costs" is a term that, sometimes confusingly, incorporates a variety of 
different costs. The present analysis focuses on costs that inhibit bargaining and free choice, 
which makes appropriate the broadest possible definition of transaction costs, "all obstacles to 
bargaining." ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 91-94 (4th ed. 2004 ). 
53. See id. at88-90; RICHARD A. PosNER,EcoNOMICANALYSISOFLAW 55-56 (6thed. 2003). 
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2. Public Employment: Agreeing to Employer Conditions 
Until the mid-twentieth century, the waiver doctrine was the express 
reason that public employees had no First Amendment speech rights against 
their government employers: 
[T]he unchallenged dogma was that a public employee had no right 
to object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment-including 
those which restricted ... constitutional rights. The classic formulation of 
this position was that of Justice Holmes' ... on the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts ... : "[A policeman] may have a constitu-
tional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a 
l . ,54 po tceman. 
The Court clearly relied upon the waiver rationale up to and including in 
its 1952 decision in Adler v. Board of Education of New York.55 Adler allowed 
a state law that barred from civil service jobs any individuals who had 
advocated the overthrow of the government by force: 
It is clear that such persons have the right ... to assemble, speak, 
think and believe as they will. It is equally clear that they have no 
right to work for the State ... on their own terms. They may work 
for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid down by the 
proper authorities .... If they do not choose to work on such terms, they 
are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere.
56 
Adler was abrogated in just a few years, the Court later explaining that 
"constitutional doctrine which has emerged since that decision has rejected its 
major premise ... that public employment ... may be conditioned upon the 
surrender of constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct 
• !!57 government actlon. 
Yet the waiver rationale has survived the death of Adler. It exists 
alongside the external costs argument as a reason the Court does provide--or 
at least could provide-less speech protection in public employment than 
in other contexts. Even after Adler was invalidated, lower courts ruling 
against public employee speech rights continued to cite the old Adler 
theory: "'If they do not choose to work on such terms, they are at liberty 
54. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1983) (alteration in original) (quoting 
McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517,517 (Mass. 1892)). 
55. 342 u.s. 485 (1952). 
56. Id. at 492 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
57. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605--06 (1967) (invalidating a policy similar 
to that upheld in Adler). 
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to retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere."'58 Considering 
its discredited origins, the waiver argument has proven remarkably resilient. 
It appeared in the 2006 Supreme Court decision substantially narrowing 
public employee speech rights, Garcetti v. Ceballos59 : "When a citizen enters 
government service, the citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations 
on his or her freedom."60 The earliest post-Garcetti decisions began to echo 
the old Holmes-through-Adler logic about having "no constitutional right 
to be a policeman"-for example, by explaining Garcetti as holding that a 
public employee "has no free speech interest in performing the duties of 
h .. b ,61 lS JO . 
Setting aside its roots in the case law and turning to the merits of the 
waiver argument, the argument stands on shaky ground. An employee's 
decision to work for a public employer may sometimes be a free choice 
when she is deciding whether to accept a job, but not always, given the 
high unemployment rates in certain major municipalities and state capitals 
that employ large numbers of public employees.62 Additionally, once 
employees already have been on the job, they have less realistic choice to 
leave the job if they object to a workplace rule. 
Leaving a job entails costs and risks. Job searches impose information 
costs, and interviewing and moving to a new workplace impose transaction 
costs, including substantial amounts of time. Quitting before knowing what 
job one might find is obviously risky because the next job could be 
58. Cook v. Hudson, 365 F. Supp. 855, 859 (D. Miss. 1973) (quoting Adler, 342 U.S. at 
492) (allowing a public school policy barring public school teachers from enrolling their 
children in a racially discriminatory private school). 
59. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006). 
60. Id. at 1958 (emphasis added). 
61. Donnell v. City of Cedar Rapids, 437 F. Supp. 2d 904, 929 n.13 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (one 
of the first cases to cite and apply Garcetti); see also Ruotolo v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 
5045 (SHS), 2006 WL 2033662, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2006) ("When a public employee goes 
'to work and perform[s) the tasks he [i)s paid to perform,' that employee acts as a governmental 
employee and his speech is not protected by [the] First Amendment." (alterations in original) 
(quoting Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960)); Logan v. Dep't ofCorr., No. 1:04-cv-0797-SEB-JPG, 2006 WL 
1750583, at *1 (S.D. Ind. June 26, 2006) ("If the speech giving rise to Defendant's punitive 
action against the speaker/employee occurred as part of the employee's job, then the 
government agency does not infringe any private liberties because the speech 'owes its 
existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities."' (quoting Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 
1960) ). For further discussion of these decisions, which appear to be the first three federal cases 
dismissing claims on the newly announced Garcetti doctrine, see Bice, supra note 25, at 18-20. 
62. As of December 2006, for example, various cities and states had unemployment rates 
significantly higher than the federal rate of 4.5 percent: Detroit (71 percent higher); Mississippi 
(67 percent higher); Michigan (58 percent higher); District of Columbia (40 percent higher). 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Civilian Labor Force and Unemployment by State and Selected 
Area, Seasonally Adjusted, available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/laus.t03.htm (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2007). 
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inferior in any number of ways that are hard to foresee, or simply could be 
hard or impossible to find. Even if one does not leave a job until the next job 
is lined up, there still is risk: One never knows in advance what the new 
job will really be like.63 
Once an employee already has been on the job for a period of time, 
moreover, there are additional costs to leaving. These costs often include a 
loss of benefits, as a new job may not offer health benefits or retirement plan 
participation for the first few months or year,64 and leaving a job often entails 
losing not yet vested deferred compensation65 or retirement benefits.66 More 
subjectively, an employee who holds a job for a long time may come to feel an 
emotional attachment to it (assuming he or she actually likes the job), as 
indicated by social science findings on the "endowment effect" (valuing 
something more when one has it for a longer time).67 Finally, leaving a 
63. Most risks that a new job will be worse than anticipated are not legally actionable. 
Only in certain jurisdictions can employees sue new employers for fraudulent misrepresentation, and 
even there only for certain types of clear misrepresentations. See generally Scott A. Moss, Where 
There's At-Will, There Are Many Ways: Redressing the Increasing Incoherence of Employment At-Will, 
67 U. PITT. L. REV. 295 (2005). 
64. See jOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 
291 (3d ed. 2000) ("A [pension] plan is permitted to exclude employees who have not 
completed one year of service." (citing IRC § 410(a)(l)(A) (2000), and ERISA § 202(a)(l)(A) 
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(l)(A) (2000)))); Elizabeth Hubbard, Age Discrimination: 
Coping With Ambiguity, Court Decisions and Clients Thoughts From the Plaintiffs Side, in 
LITIGATION, at 630-31 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 571, 1997) 
("[l]f you have a pre-existing condition, the insurance carrier for a later employer may choose 
not to cover this condition for a period of time (typically, one year)."). More broadly, it is 
common for employers to provide new employees health insurance only after three months of 
employment-a norm sufficiently widespread to have become part of even broad legislative 
proposals to mandate employer-provided health care. See, e.g., Jennifer Bender, The Impact of 
ERISA on California Health Care Law Following the United States Supreme Court's Pro-Preemption 
Interpretation, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 1169, 1184 (2005) (recounting how even under a broad 
California bill to mandate employer-provided health insurance, "[t]o qualify for health coverage, 
an employee was required to work as least 100 hours per month for the same employer for at 
least three months"). 
65. When salespeople paid on commission leave their jobs, they often lose any right to 
commissions on sales they made for which their employer has not yet received full payment. 
See, e.g., Dwyer v. Burlington Broadcasters, Inc., 295 A.D.2d 745 (N.Y. 2002) (denying plaintiff's 
claim for her sales commissions under such circumstances). 
66. Congress noted the risk of losing accrued benefits in enacting statutory protection for 
employees at risk of being terminated just before they reach the point at which their benefits vest 
or at which they become entitled to a payout of pension benefits, for example. See MARK A. 
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.27, at 602 (3d ed. 2004) ("[ERISA's] legislative 
history contains stories of employees who were fired after many years of faithful service, just 
before they were to become eligible for a pension or other employment benefit."). 
67. See Scott A. Moss & Peter H. Huang, Judges' "Behavior" Problems: What Behavioral 
Economics and Happiness Research Say Employment Law Gets Wrong (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with authors). See generally Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 
Nw. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003). 
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job for a new one often requires moving, which for many people is a costly 
or entirely unrealistic option, as discussed above.
68 
3. Prisons: "If You Can't Do the Time, Don't Do the Crime" 
The waiver argument seems strongest as to prisoners. The cliche "if you 
can't do the time, don't do the crime" reflects this waiver argument--choosing 
to commit a crime is a choice to risk incarceration, which inherently 
involves a loss of personal autonomy. In the past, courts did so hold: 
A convicted felon ... is in a state of penal servitude to the State. He 
has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but 
all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity 
accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of the 
State .... The bill of rights is a declaration of general principles to 
govern a society of freemen, and not of convicted felons and men 
civilly dead.
69 
The modern state of the law, however, is to the contrary. A prisoner is 
not a "slave of the State" who is deemed to have "forfeited ... all his 
personal rights." The Supreme Court has so held: 
Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the 
protections of the constitution .... [P]risoners retain the constitutional 
right to petition the government for the redress of grievances; they 
are protected against invidious racial discrimination by the equal 
protection clause ... and they enjoy the protections of due process.
70 
Based on this principle, it is well established that criminal sentences cannot 
violate constitutional rights. 71 Setting aside how the Supreme Court has 
ruled, waiver of all rights does not logically follow from commission of a 
crime. To the contrary, the only waiver that seems to logically follow from 
a crime is a waiver of the rights that must be abridged for the criminal's 
prison to be operated. 
68. See supra Part Il.A.l (discussing the waiver argument in context of"choosing" public schools). 
69. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 21 Gratt. 790, 1871 WL 4928, at *4 (Va. 1871) (emphasis 
added). Contra State v. Dignan, 171 S.E. 527, 528 (W.Va. 1933) ("The principles of the Ruffin 
Case are not the law in this state. Here, all men are entitled to the protection of the Constitution, 
and this protection is not forfeited by even a convict except to the extent reasonably necessary 
to expiate the offense already committed."). 
70. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,84 (1987) (citations omitted). 
71. E.g., Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1364 (11th Cir. 1982) ("The probation 
requirements imposed ... did not merely consist of perfunctory reports; instead, the conditions 
were obviously fashioned for the purpose of making probation a meaningful rehabilitative 
experience .... Nevertheless, all such efforts must ... not violate the constitutional rights of 
the probationer."). 
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Many seem to find emotional appeal in the idea that prisoners, who 
came to be in prison by virtue of making bad choices, do not deserve the 
same rights as other citizens. Yet restrictions on prisoners' rights, however 
justified, seem best justified not on waiver principles, but on the argument that 
social need justifies infringing rights-an argument discussed below in Part II. B. 
4. Conclusion 
The arguments for waiver of speech in the contexts of public schools, 
workplaces, and prisons are weaker than they first seem. Fundamental 
rights can be deemed waived if either 
(1) the rights holder actually waived them, or 
(2) the rights holder freely chose to take some voluntary action 
that fairly could be deemed a waiver of the right. 
As discussed above, neither of these kinds of waiver exists in the 
three relevant contexts. There could also be a third argument for waiver. 
We could deem an individual's rights waived if 
(3) waiver is necessary for society, even though the rights holder 
made no actual choice to waive those rights. 
This third argument could be viewed as a waiver argument in the 
following way: Behind the "veil of ignorance,"72 when we do not know if 
we will be the speaker or a person harmed by the speech (a person, for 
example, who needs government services that are disrupted by the speech), 
we would agree that the speech should not be allowed, because it may 
harm others far more than it benefits the speaker. 
Yet, it would be a pure legal fiction to call this third argument a waiver 
argument. In reality, it is an argument that social necessity justifies 
restricting the rights of someone who really did not want to waive those 
rights and never did anything that could be fairly deemed to amount to a 
waiver. Thus, although there may be times when we allow restrictions of 
rights based on social necessity, that is not a waiver argument, but instead 
an argument for basic constitutional rights analysis-a sufficient govern-
mental interest exists to justify restricting a constitutional right. 
This sort of necessity analysis for restricting a fundamental right like 
freedom of speech typically would be a basic strict scrutiny analysis; but, as 
discussed above/3 that is not the standard that courts actually apply in 
72. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF jUSTICE passim (1999). 
7 3. See supra Part I. 
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these contexts. This Article proceeds to examine why courts use a lower 
standard than strict scrutiny to protect speech rights in the three contexts 
at issue. 
B. The Risk of Court Error: Invalidating Worthy Restrictions 
on Harmful Speech 
The discussion above rejected the idea that waiver justifies varying First 
Amendment protections by institutional context. The risk argument follows 
with two somewhat contradictory goals. The first Subpart below attempts, with 
the aid of economic theory, to establish risk as a rationale for the doctrinal 
variation that could not be explained fully with waiver. After this attempt to 
elaborate the best case possible for applying less speech-protective rules in certain 
contexts, the second Subpart reverses course, criticizing the risk rationales. 
Thus, this discussion is likely to generate disagreement among a wide 
range of readers. Some will find the risk rationales persuasive as a jus-
tification for existing doctrine, and therefore disagree with the criticisms of 
those justifications; some will agree so deeply with the criticisms that they 
might deem the apology for the status quo entirely unpersuasive; and, of 
course, some may disagree with both, perhaps suspecting that the first 
Subpart sets up a straw man as an easy target for the second Subpart. As 
the dissonance between the two Subparts shows, and as Part III argues later, 
my own view is somewhere in between those who (like most Justices, 
presumably) would defend the status quo entirely, and those who would not 
admit that any logic underlies the Court's variations of speech rights by 
institutional context. 
I apply here an economic analysis of risk, examining whether speech 
restrictions are more justified in certain contexts by a high cost or high 
probability of court decisions wrongly allowing dangerous speech. While 
economics has been applied to constitutional law less than to other fields, 
it has helped analyze certain constitutional problems;74 more specifically, 
economics and speech law (which has been modeled, at least in one 
famous theory, as a "marketplace" of ideas75 ) feature similar debates: individual 
74. See generally POSNER, supra note 53, at 649-716 (analyzing various constitutional 
issues); Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost Analysis of 
Constitutional Remedies, 91 VA. L. REV. 1135 (2005). 
75. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(arguing for "free trade in ideas--that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market .... That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. 
It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment"). "That the Abrams dissent plays a central role in 
First Amendment case law and scholarship is not disputed .... [It] now carr[ies) the weight of 
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76 r · · h M autonomy versus reasons ror soctety to restnct t at autonomy. oreover, 
economics is useful in assessing which legal rules optimally combine ( 1) 
allowing people to exercise their rights; and ( 2) restricting harmful 
activity77---exactly the question in deciding the legal standard for analyzing 
speech restrictions. 
1. The Argument for Applying Less Speech-protective Rules 
in Certain Contexts 
In settings requiring more speech restrictions than the proverbial town 
square, the risk of an erroneous ruling in favor of speech plaintiffs may be 
unusually high. To the extent that there is a heightened risk of allowing 
too much dangerous speech, the burden of proof on the government 
perhaps should not be the usual heightened scrutiny of speech restrictions. 
In a variation on the old economics-minded Learned Hand formula for 
assessing tort risk/8 this risk can be reflected in the product pL, in which p and 
L represent the probability and cost, respectively, of a judicial error of 
allowing dangerous speech that should be restricted. In certain settings 
( 1) L, the cost of an error, is particularly high and is an 
externality-a cost imposed upon third parties; and 
(2) p, the probability of an error, is particularly high, because 
(a) information costs are high for courts analyzing complex, 
specialized institutions like schools or prisons, so 
courts should apply deference to the institutions' 
judgments; and 
precedent .... " David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment 
Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857, 886, 892 (1986). The marketplace theory has drawn substantial 
criticism. See, e.g., Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry Into the Foundations and 
Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1352 (1998) ("Holmes's marketplace 
metaphor is unpersuasive as an account of the search for social and political truth .... The outcome 
of the process ... would not be an objective truth but merely an aggregate ... [of] the interests and views of 
a majority."). Yet such criticism does not at all diminish the overlap between speech theory and 
economic theory, because criticisms of the marketplace theory of speech-for example, that it 
"conceives of individuals in an overly private way," id.-parallel the criticisms of free-market economics. 
76. This is why so many traditional economic analysts of law have a libertarian orientation. 
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 53, at 161-64 (characterizing various laws regulating consensual 
sexual behavior as "unjustifiable interferences with freedom of contract" unless the activities 
they ban "impose significant costs on third parties"); id. at 244 ("The economic arguments for 
criminalization of the drug trade are rather unimpressive."). 
77. E.g., ROBERT G. BoNE, THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 125-57 (2003) 
(discussing how liberal pleading rules maximize autonomy but risk more harmful litigation, 
whereas strict pleading rules do the opposite). 
78. See POSNER, supra note 53, at 167-71. 
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(b) speech restrictions more often are warranted in cases 
involving certain institutions (such as prisons), so even 
a modest rate of judicial error can yield a high number of 
judicial errors of ruling for plaintiffs engaged in dangerous 
speech that warrants restriction. 
The Hand formula has its origins in tort law but has, at times, been 
applied to speech restrictions, including by Judge Hand himself: "In each 
case [judges] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its 
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid 
the danger."79 The combination of gravity (L) and probability (p) justified 
prosecution, Hand and later the Supreme Court held, of individuals for 
"conspiring to organize the Communist Party of the United States as a group 
to 'teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction' of the government 'by 
force and violence."'80 
Many have criticized the Hand formula for implying that a high 
potential harm (L) justifies restricting speech despite a low probability of 
that harm (p) and despite the high cost to society of reining in speech, a 
cost that offsets the benefit of eliminating the pL risk.81 Yet, as illustrated 
below, a more nuanced version of the Hand rule-that is, one scrutinizing 
high L claims closely,82 and breaking down high p claims into the factors 
that influence the probability of a bad outcome83-can avoid the pitfalls of 
the court decisions allowing dubious prosecutions of disfavored speech. 
Further, the Hand rule is used in this Article less to analyze the risk of 
speech than to analyze the risk of judicial error, a common subject of economic 
risk analysis.84 
a. High Cost of Judicial Error: Externalities of Speech 
in Certain Contexts 
In settings such as prisons, the cost (L) of a judicial error allowing 
speech that should be restricted is particularly high, because speech risks 
79. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201,212 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
80. Id. at 205 (quoting indictment). 
81. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 53, at 694-96 (noting and analyzing such criticisms). 
82. See infra Part II.B.l.a. 
83. See infra Part II.B.l.b. 
84. See, e.g., BoNE, supra note 77, at 131 (analyzing alternative pleading rules by each 
rule's "expected error cost ... the probability of an error multiplied by the social cost of the error if 
it materializes"); POSNER, supra note 53, at 563--64 ("In Hand Formula terms, due process is denied 
when B<PL, where B is the cost of the procedural safeguard, P is the probability of error if the 
safeguard is denied, and L is the magnitude of the loss if the error materializes."). 
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imposing serious harms and costs upon others-negative externalities, in 
the economic parlance.85 For example, the Court upheld a ban on prisoners 
receiving hardcover books other than directly from publishers or bookstores, 
on the theory that hardcover books might contain dangerous contraband.86 
It also upheld a ban on prisoner communications with other prisons' inmates 
because "mail between institutions can be used to communicate escape plans 
and to arrange assaults and other violent acts."87 
While the prison context is the most obvious one for finding serious 
negative externalities, the Court also has noted the potential for serious harm 
from speech in public workplaces.88 It similarly has stressed the importance 
of the mission of public education in noting how certain speech in public 
schools can be restricted if it risks harming that mission.89 
b. High Probability of Judicial Error 
A second component of the argument for less restrictive rules in 
certain contexts is that the probability of error is high. The first reason this 
is so is that the cost to courts of obtaining information about the 
institutions is too high. The second is that speech restrictions may be 
warranted more often in these institutions, which would make judicial 
errors frequent under strict scrutiny. 
85. See ROBERTS. PINDYCK & DANIELL. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 621-22 (5th 
ed. 2001) (noting that a "negative externality" occurs when a party "has no incentive to account 
for the external costs that it imposes" and therefore "produces too much output" in the sense of 
undertaking the activity even when the costs exceed the benefits, because the party ignores the 
costs it imposes on others). 
86. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
87. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91 (1987). 
88. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006) (noting that if public 
employers did not have "a significant degree of control over their employees' words and 
actions ... there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public services. Public 
employees, moreover, often occupy trusted positions in society. When they speak out, they can 
express views that contravene governmental policies or impair the proper performance of 
governmental functions" (citations omitted)); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151 (1983) 
("'[T]he Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over the 
management of its personnel and internal affairs. This includes the prerogative to remove 
employees whose conduct hinders efficient operation ... with dispatch. Prolonged retention of a 
disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory employee can adversely affect discipline and morale ... and 
ultimately impair the efficiency of an office or agency."' (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 
134, 168 (1974) (Powell,]., concurring in part))). 
89. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678 (1986) ("One teacher 
reported that on the day following the speech, she found it necessary to forgo a portion of the 
scheduled class lesson in order to discuss the speech with the class."); id. at 683 ("The process of 
educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and 
the civics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order."). 
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( 1) High Information Costs as a Basis for Deference 
In contexts such as schools or prisons, courts may lack the expertise to 
second-guess professional judgments as to the need to restrict speech 
activities. A ruling in favor of a free speech plaintiff replaces the judgment 
of institutional experts with that of a nonexpert judge, entailing high 
information costs to courts and litigants analyzing complex institutions, 
and creating a serious risk of error costs. 
In institutions involving specialized knowledge, such as schools and 
prisons,90 the information costs of adjudication may be especially high. 
Litigants must expend more time and expense explaining the case to the 
court, and the court must expend more time and effort learning the information 
necessary to make a good ruling. When information costs (or any other 
transaction costs) are high, then error costs will be high as well, because 
with the courts likely having less information when making their rulings, 
the odds of erroneous rulings are greater. 
Arguments for heightened deference to defendants' decisions, and thus 
for less protection for individual rights, appear explicitly in various lines 
of case law. 
Schools, Public and Private. Parallel arguments for deference to 
school defendants appear in various kinds of cases-not just First 
Amendment cases against public schools,
91 
but also constitutional 
challenges to affirmative action at public universities
92 
and discrimination 
cases against higher education institutions.
93 
90. There is a deference argument for public employment cases as well, as detailed below, but it is 
not based on public workplaces being institutions that involve the sort of specialized knowledge 
it takes to understand prison or school management. 
91. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 ("[D]etermination of what manner of speech in the classroom 
or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board."). 
92. In upholding affirmative action in law school admissions, the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306 (2003), applied an interesting mix of strict scrutiny of and deference to the law school's race-
conscious admissions process: 
The Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational 
mission is one to which we defer. The Law School's assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield 
educational benefits is substantiated by respondents and their amici. Our scrutiny of the interest 
asserted by the Law School is no less strict for taking into account complex educational 
judgments in an area that lies primarily within the expertise of the university. Our 
holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference w a university's 
academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits. 
Id. at 328 (emphases added) (citations omitted). 
93. See generally Scott A. Moss, Against "Academic Deference": How Recent Developments in 
Employment Discrimination Law Undercut an Already Dubious Doctrine, 27 BERKElEY J. EMP. & lAB. L. 1 
(2006) (collecting cases and critiquing doctrine based on its inconsistency with other doctrine 
and based on social norms and economic theory). 
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Public Employment. The Court has noted in the context of a free 
speech case that certain government jobs require "close working 
relationships with ... superiors," and in such jobs, "a wide degree of 
deference to the employt:r's judgment is appropriate."94 Moreover, 
courts analyze employee First Amendment claims with the same 
pleading and proof rules as in all kinds of employment claims, in 
which deference is the corollary of the employment-at-will rule: 
"Courts must act with a certain restraint when examining an employer's 
personnel decisions."
95 
Prisons. In prisoner speech cases, courts grant '"substantial deference 
to the professional judgment of prison administrators"'
96
-a deference 
that is "wide-ranging ... [b]ecause the realities of running a penal 
institution are complex and difficult .... "
97 
This deference not only 
lightens the government's burden of justifying a speech restriction, but 
actually shifts the burden back to the speech plaintiff, and makes it a 
burden of "conclusive" proof. "It is enough," the Court holds, when 
prisons officials "have not conclusively been shown to be wrong" in 
deeming speech restriction warranted.
98 
1659 
Thus, the deference argument is one with deep and broad roots. First 
Amendment speech law is merely one of the areas of law among many in 
which courts defer to defendants' judgments; and public schools, public 
workplaces, and prisons are merely three of the contexts in which courts defer. 
(2) Speech Restrictions Are More Frequently Warranted 
Should untrammeled speech usually be allowed? The answer is yes for 
society in general. Even controversial speech occurs on public property and 
94. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151-52 (1983) (emphasis added) (discussing the 
lower court's decision in rejecting the public employee's speech claim). 
95. Kearney v. Town of Wareham, 316 F.3d 18, 25 {1st Cir. 2002) ('"Courts may not sit as 
super personnel departments, assessing the merits-or even the· rationality--of employers' 
nondiscriminatory business decisions."' (quoting Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 
{1st Cir. 1991))). 
96. Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2575-76 (2006) (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 
U.S. 126, 132 (2003)) (upholding a policy that "denies newspapers, magazines, and photographs 
to a group of specially dangerous and recalcitrant inmates" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
97. Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 126 (1977); see also Turner v. 
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987) ("'[C]ourts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent 
problems of prison administration and reform' ... [and should] accord deference to the appropriate 
prison authorities." (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974 ))). 
98. Janes, 433 U.S. at 132 (upholding prison officials' barring of unions because "prison 
officials concluded that ... a prisoners' labor union would be detrimental to order and security in 
the prisons. It is enough to say that they have not been conclusively shown to be wrong in this view"). 
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in the media with little threat of serious social harm99 and little concern 
that courts cannot analyze the matter properly.
100 
It is appropriate, therefore, to 
presume speech restrictions invalid by applying heightened scrutiny to 
government efforts to restrict speech. 
In certain institutions, however, we cannot as easily presume that most 
speech restrictions are invalid. As discussed above, speech is more likely to 
cause negative externalities in institutions in which discipline is critical 
and in which people coexist in a tight-knit setting such as a school, a 
workplace, or a prison101-in contrast to the society in general, where people 
usually can avoid each other as they see fit. 
Further, whereas few sue frivolously for the right to speak on public 
property, meritless speech lawsuits may be common in certain institutions. 
There are many meritless prisoner lawsuits, in part because litigation does 
not impose much cost or risk on prisoners (who have plenty of time on 
their hands and little of the fear of employer or community disdain that 
most citizens might have from litigating a controversial case),
102 
but also in 
part because prisoners can be mischievous, as some of the stranger prisoner 
lawsuits, such as the following, illustrate: 
Rather than ... any particular theology ... the Church of the New 
Song ... encourage[s] a relatively non-structured, free-form, do-as-
you-please philosophy, the sole purpose of which is to cause or 
encourage disruption of established prison discipline ... [which] is 
not the result of this so-called religion; it is rather the underlying 
purpose .... [T]he "Church's" one attempt at a paschal type feast 
produced a tongue-in-cheek request for prison authorities to supply 
steak and wine .... [T]he services ... at the Atlanta penitentiary 
were nothing more than "gripe sessions" ... to gain advantages over 
other inmates not belonging to the "group" and were totally lacking 
in anything approaching religious content. 
103 
Weak employee lawsuits also are common, though for a different 
reason. The employment-at-will rule makes most terminations lawful, even 
99. See supra Part ll.A.l. 
100. See supra Part I LA. 
101. See, e.g., supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
102. Prisoners do suffer one nontrivial consequence of filing frivolous claims: Under the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, if a prisoner files three federal lawsuits or appeals that are 
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, that prisoner is barred 
from filing any further lawsuits or appeals "unless the prisoner is under imminent danger or 
serious physical injury." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2000); see Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (applying and upholding§ 1915(g) against constitutional challenge). This is a limited 
sanction, however, and it still leaves prisoners able to file at least two frivolous lawsuits. 
103. Theriault v. Silber, 391 F. Supp. 578, 582 (W.O. Tex. 1975). 
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if they are unfair enough to motivate an employee to sue out of ignorance 
or spite.104 The fact that the employment-at-will rule is so well entrenched 
but so little known to workers
105 
may help explain why employment 
discrimination cases account for a substantial portion of the federal docket 
(about 10 percent), but "generally fare worse than most other kinds of civil 
[suits] .... [P]laintiffs have long suffered success rates that fall below other 
civil plaintiffs."106 Even workers and lawyers aware of the employment-at-will 
doctrine may well file lawsuits when they strongly believe employees have 
been treated unfairly but have only a weak claim of retaliation against 
speech activities or discrimination. 
Thus, speech claims cannot as easily be presumed valid in certain 
institutions, like workplaces and prisons/07 as in the public property speech 
context. If the government should prevail more often in cases involving 
those institutions, then even a modest rate of judicial error can yield a high 
number of judicial errors (rulings for plaintiffs whose dangerous speech 
warrants restriction). 
This point-that the choice of legal rule should be based in part on a 
judgment as to the proportion of lawsuits that are and are not meritorious-
parallels Robert Bone's economic analysis of "strict pleading" versus "notice 
pleading" rules.108 Strict pleading increases the odds that courts will erroneously 
dismiss meritorious suits; notice pleading increases the odds that courts will 
erroneously permit nonmeritorious suits to proceed. If most lawsuits are 
frivolous, that fact militates in favor of the prodefendant standard, strict 
pleading, because the population of cases subject to the error that strict 
pleading yields (meritorious cases facing a risk of erroneous dismissal) is 
smaller than the population of cases subject to the error that notice 
pleading yields (nonmeritorious cases erroneously allowed to proceed). If 
most lawsuits are meritorious, then the reverse is true: The proplaintiff 
standard, notice pleading, would minimize the greater risk of error. This 
may explain why, even though the general rule for federal litigation is 
104. See Kearney v. Town of Wareham, 316 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2002), for an illustration of 
courts' application of the employment-at-will rule. See generally Moss, supra note 63. 
105. See Jesse Rudy, What They Don't Know Won't Hurt Them: Defending Employment-at-Will 
in Light of Findings That Employees Believe They Possess ]ust Cause Protection, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. 
& LAB. L. 307 (2002). 
106. Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. 
REV. 555, 558 (2001 ). 
107. I omit mention of schools here because while there is evidence that most employee and 
prisoner claims ultimately lose, there is less such evidence as to student speech claims. 
108. BONE, supra note 77. 
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notice pleading/09 heightened pleading standards apply to categories of 
cases about which more skepticism may be warranted, such as securities 
fraud class actions. 110 
The analogy to Bone's analysis here is that in settings such as 
workplaces and especially prisons where free speech claims are less likely to 
be meritorious, it may be appropriate to depart from the usual proplaintiff 
rule of heightened scrutiny for speech restrictions. Deferring more to 
governmental speech restrictions risks erroneous rejections of meritorious 
plaintiffs' claims-but if there are relatively fewer meritorious claims in 
workplaces and prisons, that error risk is lower, and heightening plaintiffs' 
burden minimizes the countervailing risk of erroneously allowing speech 
that should be restricted. 
c. Summary: The Case for a Lower Burden on Government Entities 
Defending Speech Restrictions 
The above discussion illustrates that in certain contexts, speech 
restrictions may be especially warranted because of both the higher harm 
that dangerous speech can cause and the higher likelihood that courts 
would erroneously rule in favor of a plaintiff seeking the right to undertake 
such dangerous speech activities. 
In contrast, a speaker on common public property does not typically 
create such social costs or risks, even if he is harshly criticizing the 
government. He or she does not risk harming the internal discipline of a 
necessarily tightly controlled institution like a public school, workplace, 
or prison; unlike schoolchildren or prisoners, he is not presumptively a risk 
to society who merits a special degree of control; and there is little reason to 
think that judges lack competence to decide upon speech claims not 
involving complex institutions. 
The fact that the government should win more often in speech cases 
involving certain institutional contexts may justify a lesser burden of proof 
for the government. High litigation costs and error costs can result when 
courts apply a high burden of proof, such as strict scrutiny, to a party that 
frequently will have valid reasons for its actions. That is, when the party 
that should win faces a high burden of proof, it may get sued more than it 
should {litigation costs) and may lose more than it should (error costs). As 
to the latter problem, the government may be unsuccessful in defending 
109. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
110. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). 
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worthy speech restrictions, simply because courts do make mistakes, and 
under a heightened burden, the government more often will be unable to 
marshal its evidence and present its case sufficiently to convince the factfinder 
that it has met its high burden. 
2. The Argument Against Applying Less Speech-protective Rules 
in Certain Contexts 
The analysis above is not critical but descriptive. Amidst case law that 
is not always clear as to why speech rights should vary by institutional 
context, it attempts to discern and justify that variation in speech rights. 
Some readers may find the above defense of the status quo compelling and 
reject the critical analysis of this Subpart, which finds the rationales for 
tailoring to be underwhelming when examined closely. 
This Subpart expresses skepticism about some, though not all, of the 
above arguments for tailoring. It expresses some skepticism about the merits 
of the first argument: that speech threatens high externalities (L) to an 
unusual degree in certain institutions. It expresses even deeper skepticism 
about the second argument: that an unusual degree of deference is proper 
when reviewing certain institutions' speech restrictions. 
This Subpart does not challenge, but rather accepts, the third 
argument: that speech restrictions are warranted more often in certain 
institutions. Yet the third argument alone, even if supported by a moderate 
version of the first argument (externalities), does not go that far toward 
justifying a different test or level of scrutiny for speech rights. 
a. High Cost of Judicial Error: An Exaggerated Argument; Spending Can 
Obviate Certain Risks 
While many speech restrictions are justified by describing the harms 
that unrestricted speech could cause, some speech restrictions would be 
unnecessary if the governmental entity simply would spend more to monitor 
the disputed speech. A pair of Supreme Court decisions on prison speech 
restrictions is instructive: BeU v. Wolfish,ll 1 which allowed a ban on prisoners 
receiving hardcover books in the mail other than directly from publishers or 
bookstores; and Turner v. Safley,m which allowed a ban on prisoners 
mailing letters to inmates in other prisons. 
111. 441U.S.520(1979). 
112. 482 u.s. 78 (1987). 
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Bell strikingly conflated the state interest in avoiding high dangers 
like prisoners with weapons (certainly compelling) and the state 
interest in avoiding expensive procedures for mail processing (certainly 
less compelling): 
[T]o make a "proper and thorough" inspection of such items, prison 
officials would have to remove the covers of hardback books and to 
leaf through every page ... to ensure that drugs, money, weapons, 
or other contraband were not secreted in the material. "This 
search process would take a substantial and inordinate amount of 
available staff time."
113 
Turner then implicitly extended Bell by stressing that the prison in Bell 
could have prevented the feared contraband smuggling with not only 
time-consuming labor, but also certain technology, namely, machines to 
. . k 114 scan mcommg pac ages. 
Thus, it often is possible to trade off error costs of allowing dangerous 
speech and administrative costs of monitoring and screening speech-
because the monitoring and screening can avoid the harm threatened by 
some fraction of that speech (like some prisoner mail). Accordingly, the 
real government interest in many security risk cases is avoiding mere 
administrative costs, not avoiding dangerous speech-and the former is a 
far weaker basis for restricting speech than the latter. 
Where speech threatens dangers that can be prevented with either a 
speech restriction or an expenditure of administrative costs, such as 
security staffing or equipment, the Court has held that the government 
must incur the costs rather than restrict the speech. 115 The government 
113. Bell, 441 U.S. at 549 (quoting prison warden). 
114. Turner, 482 U.S. at 88. 
115. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1943) (striking down an 
ordinance requiring the purchase of a license to sell written materials: "It is a license tax-a flat 
tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights. A state may not impose 
a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal constitution"); Schneider v. New 
Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (striking down ordinances restricting distribution of handbills 
in public, noting the validity of the government interest in clean streets, but holding that "[a)ny 
burden imposed upon the city authorities in cleaning and caring for the streets as an indirect 
consequence of such distribution results from the constitutional protection of the freedom of speech 
and press"); cf. Ad World, Inc. v. Doylestown, 672 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d Cir. 1982) (disallowing an 
ordinance prohibiting door-to-door distribution of advertising material, which included 
community newspapers, and noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has tenaciously protected the 
right of a speaker to reach a potential listener and get the listener's attention. It does not seem 
onerous to impose on the potential listener some of the costs of this important freedom" (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted)); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205 (7th Cir. 1978) (disallowing an ordinance 
prohibiting disseminating materials that promote hatred based on heritage, and rejecting an 
argument that other important public policies, such as antidiscrimination goals, would be 
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can charge "a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the 
expenses of policing the activities in question,"
116 
and prohibitively high 
costs might justify speech restrictions; however, most of the prison cases 
do not entail costs too high to bear or to charge as per-use fees. Most of 
those cases involve more extensive screening of incoming mail and 
visitors-an expense that is not trivial but is well below the substantial 
costs that courts force municipalities to incur for the necessary police 
staffing and equipment to ensure safety and order at public protests and rallies.117 
The Court has so held not only in cases involving prisons, but also in 
cases involving schools, albeit as to a different constitutional right. In 
striking down excessively broad affirmative action programs, the Court 
held that the mere fact that a program infringing less on consti-
tutional rights "might present administrative challenges does not render 
undercut by allowing such speech: "The Village ... argu[es] ... that it has a policy of fair 
housing, which the dissemination of racially defamatory material could undercut. We reject 
this argument without extended discussion. That the effective exercise of First Amendment rights 
may undercut a given government's policy on some issue is, indeed, one of the purposes of those 
rights" (emphasis added)). 
116. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 113-14 (disallowing a license fee but noting the more 
permissible "nominal fee" option); see also Am. Target Adver., Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 
1249 (lOth Cir. 2000) (reviewing regulations of fundraising organizations, and upholding a 
"$250 regulatory fee ... [that] does no more than defray reasonable administration costs" of 
state antifraud efforts but disallowing the requirement that an organization must "provide proof 
that it is bonded or provide a letter of credit in the amount of at least $25,000 ... [as] a sizeable 
price tag upon the enjoyment of a guaranteed freedom"); MacDonald v. Chi. Park Dist., 
132 F.3d 355, 363 n.8 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that park-use fees for speech activities 
are permissible "absent a threat that the allegedly excessive fees are likely to suppress 
protected speech"); Nat'! Awareness Found. v. Abrams, 50 F.3d 1159, 1165 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(citing Murdock). 
117. See, e.g., Church of Am. Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. City of Gary, 334 F.3d 676, 
680-81 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (granting an injunction against restrictions and fees 
applicable to a proposed Ku Klux Klan rally, which would "require a heavy police presence, at 
some cost ... in police overtime unless the police thin out coverage in other parts of the 
City ... 'fencing and barricades that enforce separation of the Klan from other attendees, who, 
themselves, must be separated into separate enclosures for pro and con demonstrators and all 
three separated from the press, for its safety ... [and] separate parking areas must be provided 
and guarded, and all attendees must be screened for weapons"'; holding that "a permit for a 
parade or other assembly ... cannot be denied because the applicant's audience will 
riot ... [and] a city cannot in lieu of denying the permit charge the applicant for the 
expense ... of reining in the hecklers"); Christian Knights of Ku Klux Klan Invisible Empire, 
Inc. v. District of Columbia, 972 F.2d 365, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (upholding an order requiring 
the city to allow a "Ku Klux Klan parade[] from the Washington Monument down 
Constitution Avenue to Capitol Hill" even though "(a] violent counter-demonstration had 
been threatened, causing the full mobilization of the Metropolitan Police Department and the 
commitment of more than 3,500 police officers"). 
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constitutional an otherwise problematic system."118 Certainly, it is economically 
rational for institutions to reject costly individualized scrutiny or monitoring 
procedures in favor of cheap, across-the-board rules.119 Accordingly, the argu-
ment that in certain institutional contexts speech restrictions are necessary to 
avoid high negative externalities does not hold up to close scrutiny, at 
least in situations in which spending more on monitoring (the prison mail 
cases) or individual scrutiny (the affirmative action cases) would obviate the 
need to restrict a fundamental right. 
b. High Probability ofjudicial Error: Too Little Argument 
for Institutional Uniqueness and Judicial Inability 
The main problem with the deference argument is that it proves too 
much. It applies equally well to a wide variety of contexts and, therefore, at 
bottom, is little more than an argument that there almost always should be a 
limited scope to judicial review. As I have argued elsewhere, in criticizing the 
argument for deference to employers' decisions in discrimination cases, the argu-
ment for deference applies just as well to an extraordinarily wide range of fields: 
''The problem with this reasoning is that it would dissolve Title VII if followed to 
its logical conclusion and extended to other areas .... It would have courts defer 
to employers in a wide swath of labor markets, whenever judges feel insecure 
about their knowledge of the field."120 Contrary to the premise that judges 
cannot handle cases in fields in which they lack expertise, judges always 
118. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (rejecting the argument "that '[t]he 
volume of applications and the presentation of applicant information make it impractical ... to 
use the ... system' upheld by the Court today in Grutter," which required individualized 
applicant scrutiny rather than the less individualized affirmative action "point system" 
(alterations in original) (quoting Brief for Respondent Bollinger at 6, n. 8)); see also Daria 
Roithmayr, Direct Measures: An Alternative Form of Affirmative Action, 7 MICH.]. RACE & L. 1, 
9 (2001) (suggesting methods of individualized admissions scrutiny, following Grutter and 
Gratz: "[A] direct measures program undoubtedly will be both expensive and time-consuming 
for admissions committees, which will have to evaluate the entire applicant file including the 
personal statement. To avoid constitutional difficulty however, applications should in no way be 
pre-screened based on the racial identity of the applicants"). 
119. See generally David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, What Law Students Think They Know 
About Elite Law Firms: Preliminary Results of a Survey of Third Year Law Students, 69 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1213, 1224 (2001) (discussing law firms' use of cheap, easily visible "signals" to evaluate law 
students rather than complicated, expensive data such as references and analysis of coursework: "Grades 
and [School] Eliteness ... [are] 'visible' and 'rankable' signals that make it easy ... to make 
substantive distinctions among applicants. [R]ely[ing] heavily on these relatively inexpensive sorting 
criteria ... narrow[s] the large pool of applicants .... References from Faculty and Relevance of 
Courses ... are rarely scrutinized. Although arguably providing ... more detailed[ ] information about a 
student's skill and interest level, both ... are time consuming .... "). 
120. Moss, supra note 93, at 6. 
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adjudicate cases in fields alien to them, including "accounting partnerships; 
administrative law judgeships; law enforcement; engineering; computer program-
. 1 h d . h h . ,121 mmg; ana ar sctences sue as c emtStry. 
Indeed, for the main institutioru that feature deference to speech regulations-
public schools and prisons-judges would seem more capable of evaluating 
professional judgments than in marty other contexts. There is little reason to think 
that judges can develop a quick expertise in various private-sector specialty fields such 
as securities, accounting, or engineering. Yet, courts regularly pass judgment as to 
whether challenged securities deals were fraudulent or whether challenged private-
sector employment decisions involving technical work were pretextual. 
In contrast, judges do have a fair bit of expertise in the criminal justice 
system, given both their exteruive adjudication of prisoner filings and the 
background a great many federal judges have as prosecutors or otherwise as 
government officials in the executive or legislative branch.122 Judges also all have 
college and graduate degrees, making academic deference less deferuible than, 
say, securities or engineering deference, just to name two fields in which judges 
are much less likely to have any particular expertise. Finally, judges are public 
employers, so it is hard to see how public employment would be an area in 
which judges have little expertise. 
Perhaps more significantly, deferential scrutiny of speech restrictioru is 
incoruistent with the heightened scrutiny typically applicable to government 
restrictions of individual rights. A court applying heightened scrutiny places the 
burden of proof on the government to prove its restriction is justified; it does not 
defer to the defendant or simply ask for a merely rational justification.123 A 
deference exception to a rule of heightened scrutiny thus would be a classic 
"exception that swallows the rule"; accordingly, arguments for deference are 
arguments agairut applying heightened scrutiny at all to fundamental rights 
clairru. The fact that courts have chosen to apply heightened scrutiny to so 
many types of constitutional claims means that there is little solid reasoning 
behind applying deference to a few idiosyncratic institutional contexts. 
Finally, even if certain institutions are harder for courts to analyze 
effectively, parties and courts are unlikely to accept erroneous rulings easily, 
121. Id. at 6-7. 
122. For example, the majority of judges in three of the most populous federal district 
courts-the U.S. District Courts for the Southern District of New York, the Eastern District of 
New York, and the Central District of California (which combine for over 160 federal district and 
magistrate judges, a sizeable fraction of the total population of federal judges)-worked as 
government officials or lawyers, with the largest share of them having served as state or federal 
prosecutors. See Fed. Judicial Ctr., Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, http://www.fjc.gov/ 
public/home.nsf/hisj (last visited Mar. 6, 2007). 
123. See infra Part Ill.B (discussing the inconsistency between deference and heightened scrutiny). 
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but instead will spend more time and resources remedying the problem of 
imperfect information. As the law and economics literature has discussed at 
length, error costs can be traded off with transaction and information costs.124 
Specifically, a government defending a speech restriction is just like any 
other party in that it decides how much time and expense to invest in 
litigation; other things equal, the more it invests in litigation, the better 
and fuller the portrayal of its litigation position will be, and the lower the 
risk of an erroneous judicial ruling for the other party. 125 Thus, even where 
there is a modest degree of institutional uniqueness, that problem can be at 
least somewhat remedied with more spending on litigation, and, as discussed 
above, the mere desire to save administrative costs does not justify restricting 
fundamental rights.
126 
C. A Typology: Institutional Context and the Level of First 
Amendment Protection 
Ultimately, every reader is bound to disagree with at least some portion of 
this Article. Some will find the risk rationales sufficiently compelling as a 
justification of the status quo that they reject the dismantling of those arguments, 
and vice versa. As is often the case, though, the truth may lie somewhere in 
between these two polar positions. As discussed above, there are varied argu-
ments for applying less speech-protective doctrines in certain institutional 
contexts. These arguments, however, are not equally persuasive in all contexts. 
For example, the argument that certain contexts feature more significant 
risk (high pL) seems stronger in prisons than schools, and stronger in schools 
than workplaces. All three contexts do share certain key characteristics: All 
are institutions requiring discipline whose members are in tight-knit, 
interdependent relationships, making each person vulnerable to others. Yet, 
among the three, prisons clearly feature the highest pL: the highest likelihood of 
serious misdeeds (high L), and the strongest claim for deference to specialized 
institutional knowledge (high p of error due to information costs), because judges 
may know little about prisons but have at least some understanding of education 
and employment (because all have been students and public employers). 
Compared to workplaces, schools present more need for discipline and more risk 
of misconduct (high L), given that minor students typically lack the maturity of 
124. See, e.g., BoNE, supra note 77, at 147 (noting that "process costs," specifically more 
elaborate litigation efforts, trade off with "error cost[s]"). 
125. See, e.g., id. at 203 {noting that parties spend litigation costs on discovery to remedy 
their lack of information). 
126. See supra notes 115-119 and accompanying text. 
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gainfully employed adults, and schools have more interest in controlling 
student behavior than a workplace does in controlling employee behavior. 
Deference also seems more appropriate for schools (due to high p) than 
workplaces; administration of schools seems harder to understand from the 
outside than administration of a workplace. 
Similarly, the waiver argument, though somewhat questionable in all 
contexts, seems most plausible in prisons. Prisoners, in choosing to commit 
crimes, exercised at least some autonomous choice that carried a known risk of 
losing some degree of freedom, even if the loss of speech rights in particular was 
not a freedom that imprisonment would foreseeably restrict. And while some 
employees are entirely tied to their jobs, it is on average more feasible to switch 
jobs than to switch schools; the latter requires either moving one's residence, 
paying for private school, or becoming a home schooling parent-all options far 
more burdensome than the average job hunt. 
Given that reasonable minds may differ about the persuasive power of the 
waiver and externalities arguments, it seems helpful to chart the strength of each 
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In short, because the arguments for tailoring are twofold-waiver and risk-
any analysis of whether an institution merits tailoring must consider 
whether either argument is persuasive as to that institution. As Diagram A 
illustrates, the case for tailoring in public schools may be stronger or 
weaker than the case for tailoring in public employment, depending on whether 
the waiver argument or the risk argument carries more weight, because the 
waiver argument is stronger for public employment, while the risk argument 
is stronger for public schools. 
Diagram A also helps compare the arguments for tailoring in different 
institutional contexts. Notably, for example, the waiver argument is about 
the same for speech restrictions by public schools and by any other local 
governments. If one waives a right to object to a school's speech restric-
tions by staying in that public school district, then logically one waives a 
right to object to a town's speech restrictions by staying in that city. To 
the extent that courts and scholars have rejected the argument that "you 
remained in that locality and therefore waived any objection to its speech 
restrictions,"127 the waiver argument is unsupportable as applied to public 
schools-and, accordingly, tailoring for schools must be based on risk 
arguments rather than waiver arguments. 
Ill. A CAUTIONARY NOTE ABOUT EXAGGERATING INSTITUTIONAL 
UNIQUENESS AND A PROPOSAL FOR INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
AS MODEST TAILORING 
A. Avoiding the Exaggeration of Institutional Uniqueness in Tailoring 
This Article argues that heightened scrutiny should apply to speech 
restrictions regardless of institutional context. I will refrain from wading 
into the turbulent sea of literature, dating back to Karl Llewellyn and 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, about whether legal rules should be general or 
subject specific.128 Rather, the specific question this Article addresses is this: 
Is more uniformity across institutions feasible for speech claims, or would 
more uniformity be unable to account for the particularities of certain 
institutions, like public schools, workplaces, and prisons, which differ in 
meaningful ways from society at large? 
127. See supra Part II.A.l. 
128. Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and me First Amendment, supra note 14, at 107-13, 118--19 
(discussing range of views). 
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Schauer suggests that speech law generally takes too little account of 
institutional context, resulting in "too often treat[ing] settings, institutions, 
and contexts similarly when ... they are substantially and relevantly different."129 
This Article does not take issue with Schauer's arguments as to the main 
institutions he analyzes: media types, means of communication, and gov-
ernmental speech activities. Rather, this Article argues that as to certain 
institutions within which speech rights commonly are curtailed-public 
schools, workplaces, and prisons-a more uniform, less institution-specific 
speech doctrine could take appropriate account of institutional difference 
without exaggerating those differences, as the current doctrine does. 
First, in splintering First Amendment doctrine into "a doctrine for 
every institution," the Court has not simply accounted for institutional 
uniqueness; rather, it has to a large degree exaggerated institutional uniqueness. 
This was the main point of Part II of this Article. The arguments that 
certain institutions face such a greater threat of negative externalities 
from speech, or are so much less comprehensible to courts reviewing their 
speech restrictions, do not hold up under close examination. Thus, if the 
question is whether more unified doctrine would have too little recognition 
of institutional weakness, then one answer is, "compared to what?"-
because the status quo of institution-specific doctrine yields too much 
recognition of institutional uniqueness. 
Second, the Court has, in its equal protection jurisprudence, shifted 
from context-specific doctrine to more unified doctrine with little loss of 
ability to account for nuanced contextual differences. One such case 
specifically involved prisons. In Johnson v. Califomia, 130 the Court declared 
that strict scrutiny, not deferential rational basis scrutiny, applied to temporary 
racial segregation of incoming prisoners. Though the prisons asserted a 
context-specific security interest for the segregation-"to prevent violence 
caused by racial gangs"131-the Court rejected for equal protection exactly 
the sort of context-based rulemaking it applies in First Amendment cases. 
129. Schauer, supra note 4, at 1270. 
130. 543 u.s. 499 (2005). 
131. Id. at 502. To elaborate further: 
[Defendant] cites numerous incidents of racial violence ... and identifies five major 
prison gangs in the State: Mexican Mafia, Nuestra Familia, Black Guerilla Family, 
Aryan Brotherhood, and Nazi Low Riders. The CDC [California Department of 
Corrections] also notes that prison-gang culture is violent and murderous. [I]f race 
were not considered in making initial housing assignments, [it] is certain there would 
be racial conflict .... The CDC claims that it must therefore segregate all inmates 
while it determines whether they pose a danger .... 
Id. at 502-03. 
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The Court rejected the argument that for equal protection claims in the 
prison context, the usual strict scrutiny should be replaced with mere 
rational basis scrutiny, as Turner v. Safieyuz provided for speech claims in 
the prison context: 
[W)e have applied Turner's reasonable-relationship test only to rights 
that are "inconsistent with proper incarceration." ... The right not 
to be discriminated against based on one's race is not susceptible to the 
logic of Turner. It is not a right that need necessarily be compromised 
for the sake of proper prison administration. On the contrary, 
compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment's ban on racial 
discrimination is not only consistent with proper prison 
administration, but also bolsters the legitimacy of the entire criminal 
• . 133 
JUStice system. 
The Johnson Court's distinction between speech rights and equality 
rights seems conclusory. Could it not equally be said that "compliance with 
the [First] Amendment's ban on [speech restrictions] is not only consistent 
with proper prison administration, but also bolsters the legitimacy of the 
entire criminal justice system"? Further, exactly why is it the case that 
racial equality, taken to the far extent of forbidding (as in Johnson) even 
temporary segregation of prisoners based on plausible security concerns, "is 
not a right that need necessarily be compromised for the sake of proper 
prison administration"-whereas speech rights "need necessarily be 
compromised"? In short, by failing to explain persuasively why the strict 
scrutiny that works for equal protection claims would not work for speech 
claims, the Johnson Court left ample reason to believe that heightened 
scrutiny would work just as well for prisoners' speech claims. 
Johnson expressly asserted one point helpful to this Article's advocacy 
of heightened scrutiny for First Amendment claims in all contexts: that strict 
scrutiny "is designed to take relevant differences into account," including 
"special circumstances" presented by "dangerous places" such as prisons: 
The [California Department of Corrections] protests that strict 
scrutiny will handcuff prison administrators .... Not so. Strict scrutiny is 
not "strict in theory, but fatal in fact." [It] does not preclude the 
ability of prison officials to address the compelling interest in prison 
safety. [They] will have to demonstrate that any race-based policies 
are narrowly tailored to that end. 
132. 482 u.s. 78 (1987). 
133. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510-11. 
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The fact that strict scrutiny applies "says nothing about the ultimate 
validity of any particular law .... " Prisons are dangerous places, and 
the special circumstances they present may justify racial classifications in 
some contexts. Such circumstances can be considered in applying strict 
scrutiny, which is designed to take relevant differences into account.
134 
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In a different area of equal protection law-affirmative action-the 
Court has illustrated more fully how strict scrutiny can take account of 
institutional context. For decades, the Court left affirmative action an 
exception to its rule of strict scrutiny for racial classifications,135 but 
Adarand Constructors v. Pena136 declared strict scrutiny applicable to racial 
affirmative action. Justice O'Connor pointedly sought in Adarand "to 
dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."'m 
Nevertheless, many remained skeptical that strict scrutiny analyses could 
account for context sufficiently to recognize that while racial classifications 
rarely pass muster, modest affirmative action plans might. 138 
Ultimately, the Court in the two University of Michigan affirmative 
action cases, which invalidated the more sweeping affirmative action 
plan139 but allowed the more modest one/40 illustrated how strict scrutiny 
can apply across the board, even in contexts in which it may be appropriate 
both to allow exceptions to the presumption of invalidity and to allow "a 
degree of deference to a university's academic decisions, within con-
stitutionally prescribed limits."141 
Thus, the Court's equal protection jurisprudence illustrates how 
applying a consistent constitutional test to all contexts, rather than the sort 
of context-specific rules featured in the First Amendment, would not 
necessarily destroy the ability of the Court to consider institutional context. 
134. Id. at 514-15 (citations omitted). 
135. See CHEMER!NSKY, supra note 3, § 9.3.5.1 (noting splintered Court decisions as to 
the appropriate level of scrutiny for racial affirmative action). 
136. 515 u.s. 200 (1995). 
137. Id. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,519 (1980) (Marshall,)., concurring)). 
138. See, e.g., Emanuel Margolis, Affirmative Action: Deja Vu All Over Again?, 27 Sw. U. 
L. REV. 1, 39 (1997) (noting that the Court declined to review three appellate cases striking 
down affirmative action in college admissions, scholarships, and public employment; "a 'cert. 
denied' pattern ... that can only be described as discouraging" for supporters of affirmative 
action, "certainly in light of Adarand [Constructors, Inc. v. Penal decided in the following 
year"). Of course, not all commentators saw Adarand as the end of affirmative action. See, e.g., 
Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the Condition and Theory, 43 
B.C. L. REV. 521, 606-07 (2002) (noting indications that justice O'Connor might uphold some 
affirmative action programs under strict scrutiny). 
139. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003 ). 
140. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
141. I d. at 3 28. See supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text for more of this portion of Grutter. 
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Such a move toward greater First Amendment consistency therefore would 
be feasible and, as discussed above, advisable as a reform of this confused 
area of constitutional law. 
B. Intermediate Scrutiny as Modest Tailoring That Keeps a Presumption 
Against Rights Restrictions 
Ultimately, however, this Article concedes that a modest amount of 
institutional tailoring may be appropriate for a simple reason: It is unclear 
whether strict scrutiny is really as capable of taking institutional 
difference into account as claimed by Justice O'Connor, the author of 
both Johnson v. California and Grutter v. Bollinger, 142 the two main cases in 
which the Court upheld a racial classification it analyzed with strict 
scrutiny. Various commentators sympathetic to the idea of at least some 
degree of affirmative action have criticized Grutter for not featuring true 
strict scrutiny, on two main grounds. First, Grutter's notion of strict 
scrutiny with "a degree of deference"143 is oxymoronic. Strict scrutiny 
entails not deferring to the governmental entity being challenged'44 and 
not assuming (as the Court did) good faith on the part of that entity.145 
Second, having accepted diversity as a compelling interest, Grutter did not 
truly undertake the second part of the strict scrutiny analysis-whether 
142. 539 u.s. 306. 
143. Id. at328. 
144. See, e.g., Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Grutter and Gratz: A Critical Analysis, 41 Hous. L. 
REV. 459, 468--69 (2004) (criticizing Grutter's deference argument: "Was the Court stating that 
diversity is a compelling state interest because the Michigan Law School says it is? Surely not. 
If so, then the Court has effectively dropped the standard of review from strict scrutiny to 
rational basis review"; also criticizing the Court's reliance on amici briefs, noting that 
"deferring to the conclusions of amici wholly untested by the adversarial process seems even 
more troublesome than deferring to the conclusions of a party to the litigation"); Pamela S. 
Karlan, Compelling Interests/Compelling Institutions: Law Schools as Constitutional Litigants, 54 
UCLA L. REV. 1613, 1621-22 (2007) (criticizing Grutter for saying it was '"giving a degree of 
deference to a university's academic decisions' .... Nowhere in its prior decisions had the 
Court delegated responsibility for deciding the weight of a governmental interest to some other 
governmental entity" (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328)). 
145. Karlan, supra note 144, at 1622 (criticizing Grutter's "presumption of good faith": "[A] 
central idea underpinning strict scrutiny was the Court's belief that race was a sufficiently prob-
lematic criterion that its use cannot be 'presumed' to reflect 'good faith"' .... What is striking here is 
not that the Court thinks racial diversity ... can be a compelling government purpose, but rather 
that it declares that racial diversity is compelling because schools think it is" (quoting Grutter, 
539 U.S. at 329)). 
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the race~based admissions policy was necessary to assure diversity, or whether 
race~neutral alternatives might have suffieed. 146 
Other equal protection cases similarly resort to a somewhat schizo~ 
phrenic invocation of deference in their strict scrutiny decisions to 
uphold race~based classifications by trusted institutions/47 including at 
times "strict scrutiny" review that upholds race~based classifications 
based on surprisingly slim evidence offered to justify the need to take race 
into account. 148 
In short, to take proper account of institutional context, courts have 
to alter the nature of strict scrutiny substantially, from a test that was 
every bit as "fatal in fact" as Gerald Gunther suggested to one that, in 
Justice O'Connor's hands, has "less than strict [scrutiny],"149 with the Court 
assuming the defendant's good faith, granting it deference, and not taking a 
terribly close look at less discriminatory alternatives. This is analogous to 
how the Court, in its early 1970s sex discrimination jurisprudence150 and its 
recent sexual orientation jurisprudence,l5l has invalidated laws "while 
purporting to apply a traditional 'rationality' standard." In such cases, the 
146. See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 144 ("[T]he Court could have offered a more persuasive 
explanation for the result it reached but probably felt precluded by precedent from doing so." 
Id. at 460. "The Court was probably correct in concluding that none of the race neutral 
alternatives were workable ... but it certainly could have done a better job of explaining why." 
Id. at 486.); David Crump, The Narrow Tailoring Issue in the Affirmative Action Cases: 
Reconsidering the Supreme Court's Approval in Gratz and Grutter of Race~Based Decision~Making 
by Individualized Discretion, 56 FLA. L. REV. 483 (2004) (opining that "the narrow tailoring 
requirement [is) the 'Rodney Dangerfield' of the strict scrutiny approach, because it 'don't get 
no respect,"' id. at 516, and that in Grutter and Gratz, "[the) Court's analysis of narrow 
tailoring ... is weak and unpersuasive," id. at 485, because the Court seemed to disallow 
"point" systems in Grutter, but "fixed points used in more reasonable ratios," id. at 535, 
would be more narrowly tailored than an "open-discretion" system of the sort permitted in 
Grutter," id. at 528-29). 
147. See Winkler, supra note 12, at 1941-43 (questioning granting "deference" to race-
based decisions). 
148. Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding a federal 
consent decree featuring race-based affirmative action despite offering no analysis of narrow 
tailoring and even though the only cited evidence of past discrimination was that the 
percentage of minority police officers was lower than the percentage in the applicant pool 
and labor force, which typically is insufficient to justify state and local affirmative 
action); Pagnucci v. City of New York, 785 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (upholding a 
federal consent decree featuring race-based affirmative action, with little analysis and no 
requirement of evidence beyond deferentially citing, and taking at face value, the view 
of the federal judge who had adopted the decree that it was narrowly tailored and was justified 
by past discrimination). 
149. Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1689, 1727 (2005). 
150. E.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
151. E.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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Court's critical look at governmental motive152 and at the government's 
chosen means of achieving legitimate cost savings153 "necessarily import[s] 
some suspicion of ... [such] laws," as Kathleen Sullivan and Gerald Gunther 
noted of the early sex discrimination jurisprudence. 154 
In the sex discrimination and sexual orientation jurisprudence, the 
Court purported to retain traditional rational basis scrutiny but, seeing a 
need to strike some laws, in reality applied a heightened level of scrutiny/55 
which eventually (in the sex discrimination context) took shape as 
intermediate scrutiny. 156 The problem of institutional tailoring in equal 
protection jurisprudence is essentially the reverse: The Court purports to 
retain traditional strict scrutiny but, seeing a need to uphold some laws, in 
reality applies a lesser level of scrutiny. 
Just as intermediate scrutiny proved to be a workable, stable solution 
to the problem of the creeping heightening of rational basis review, so could 
intermediate scrutiny work as a solution to the "creeping lowering" of 
strict scrutiny review that occurs when the Court faces a challenge to 
which strict scrutiny ordinarily would be applicable but sees a need to defer 
somewhat to certain institutions. The Court in]ohnscm v. Califmnia portrayed a 
dichotomous choice between the extreme "rationality review" tailoring of 
Turner v. Sajley 157 and the entirely nontailored, traditional strict scrutiny, 158 
but intermediate scrutiny is a not bad approximation of what the Court 
actually did in Johnson and Grutter: Retain heightened scrutiny but apply 
some deference to the government's policy choices. In those equal 
protection challenges to universities and to prisons, the Court undertook a 
genuinely searching analysis of the racial classifications at issue, found 
sufficiently weighty state interests at stake, and-in a nod to the need for 
tailoring-appeared to examine possible race-neutral alternatives in a 
somewhat limited fashion based on notions of deference. 
Intermediate scrutiny similarly could serve as the appropriate way to 
undertake modest tailoring in speech cases involving institutions such as 
152. See id. at 634 ("'(A] bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot 
constitute a legitimate governmental interest.'" (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 
534 (1973))). 
153. A preference for men over women in appointing estate administrators intended "to 
accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits ... [is] arbitrary legislative choice.'' 
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 772-73 (15th ed. 2004 ). 
154. ld. 
155. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 149, at 1727 ("[T]he rational basis test has become stricter 
to protect groups like the mentally retarded, the children of illegal immigrants, and homosexuals."). 
156. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
157. 482 u.s. 78 (1987). 
158. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509-12 (2005). 
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public schools, workplaces, and prisons. Like strict scrutiny, intermediate 
scrutiny remains a form of heightened scrutiny in that it places the burden 
of proof on the defendant-the governmental entity seeking to defend its 
speech restriction. 159 Also like strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny is 
capable of discerning when a weighty asserted government interest like 
security is not really at stake because it could be served by means other 
than the speech restriction at issue.
160 
As the Court once put it, intermedi-
ate scrutiny requires the government to prove that the challenged policy 
was "determined through reasoned analysis rather than through the 
mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions.'' 161 
Yet intermediate scrutiny is not nearly as "fatal in fact" as strict scrutiny, 
allowing restrictions of rights upon a sufficient governmental showing far 
more frequently than does strict scrutiny,162 in part by relaxing strict 
scrutiny's requirement that the government choose the means least 
restrictive of individual rights. 163 Thus, intermediate scrutiny strikes a 
balance between the two imperatives courts face: assuring that speech rights 
not be restricted unwarrantedly (as they often are under the deferential 
rationality standards currently applied); and assuring that courts not be 
159. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, § 6.5 (collecting and discussing cases). 
160. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490-91 (1995) (reversing a restriction on 
beer labels, under intermediate scrutiny applicable to commercial speech restrictions, and finding 
that the law at issue was "more extensive than necessary" toward the government's asserted 
goals, in light of "several alternatives" less restrictive of speech). 
161. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982). 
162. The Court on numerous occasions has upheld gender discrimination under intermediate 
scrutiny. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding an Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) rule favoring mothers over fathers); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 
57 (1981) (upholding a requirement that men but not women register for the draft); cf. Michael 
M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding gender-specific statutory rape laws; the 
plurality applied a form of heightened rationality scrutiny, but Justice Blackmun's concurrence, 
providing the fifth vote to uphold, was an application of intermediate scrutiny). The Court 
also has upheld a number of regulations of commercial speech under intermediate scrutiny. See, 
e.g., Bd. ofTrs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (upholding a bar on commercial speech in the public 
university's student dormitories). 
163. While the.equal protection cases have not discussed expressly the extent to which 
"least restrictive means" is a requirement of intermediate scrutiny, the Court has discussed the 
matter extensively in cases addressing the regulation of commercial speech, which faces 
intermediate scrutiny as well; there, the Court expressly cited deference as a reason not to 
invalidate any law that is not the "least restrictive means" possible. See, e.g., Fox, 492 U.S. at 
478 ("We uphold such restrictions so long as they are 'narrowly tailored' to serve a significant 
governmental interest, a standard that we have not interpreted to require elimination of all less 
restrictive alternatives .... [W]e have not insisted that there be no conceivable alternative, but 
only that the regulation not 'burden substantially more speech than is necessary' .... And we 
have been loath to second-guess the Government's judgment to that effect." (citations 
omitted) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,799 (1989))). 
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too quick to reject critical governmental interests that should ,justify 
certain speech restrictions (a risk under strict scrutiny). 
Accordingly, intermediate scrutiny seems the best way to assure that 
courts take appropriate, but not excessive, account of institutional needs 
that might justify speech restrictions. To be sure, intermediate scrutiny's 
ability to balance competing values is not only a strength but also a 
weakness. It draws criticism as a "malleable test that permits judges' 
subjective preferences to come into play"164 and as a test that "treats an evil 
h h . . . "165 M b dl h C ' as t oug It were a mere mconvemence. ore roa y, t e ourt s 
recent tinkerings with scrutiny tiers may, as Jack Balkin has noted, 
"suggest[ ] that ... the model of scrutiny rules has been stretched to the 
breaking point, and that the model has outlived its usefulness. "166 Yet, 
while relying on the existing middle tier of the scrutiny model-
intermediate scrutiny-may not be a perfect option, it is superior to the 
apparent alternatives. As a way for courts to analyze institutions, it is 
superior to strict scrutiny; as a \Vay to protect against unneeded speech 
restrictions, it is superior to the deferential forms of scrutiny that prevail 
under current doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
Like religion and drinking, tailoring doctrine to institutions is good in 
moderation but bad in excess. On the one hand, Holmes makes a valid 
point in mocking the (probably apocryphal) "justice of the peace before 
whom a suit was brought by one farmer against another for breaking a 
churn. The justice took time to consider, and then said that he had 
looked through the statutes and could find nothing about churns, and gave 
judgment for the defendant."167 On the other hand, Schauer makes a valid 
point in arguing that "Holmes was wrong" to so mock the possibility of 
164. George C. Hlavac, Interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause: A Constitutional Shell 
Game, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1349, 1375 (1993). 
165. Lawrence G. Sager, Of Tiers of Scrutiny and Time Travel: A Reply to Dean Sullivan, 90 
CAL. L. REV. 819, 821 (2002) ("Taken at face value, intermediate scrutiny intimates that treating 
women as less than equals is bad, but not very bad. Accordingly, if we have reasonably good 
reasons for failing to live up to the requirements of equal regard, we should let the chips of 
gender injustice fall where they may."). 
166. Balkin, supra note 149, at 1726. 
167. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 1006 (1997) 
(reprinting 1897 Holmes address). 
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arranging laws by subject, because differences among institutions sometimes 
justify different legal rules. 168 
This Article responds with a note of caution and skepticism to the 
increasing amount of scholarship echoing Schauer's call for more institutional 
tailoring in, among other fields, First Amendment law. To be sure, some 
kinds of tailoring may be prudent in First Amendment law where the 
identities of "speakers" vary greatly in relevant ways. For example, protestors 
are very different speakers than libraries making choices among books or 
government arts boards deciding which art to fund; attempting to apply 
the same rules to all such speakers would be difficult, if not futile. But in 
other areas, tailoring by institution entails great risk of, and in fact has 
produced, exaggerations of institutional uniqueness that are dangerous 
because they have curtailed speech massively in institutions that each 
govern millions of Americans-schools, public workplaces, and prisons. In 
deciding speech restrictions not based on a institution-less "law of dangerous 
speech" but instead on a "law of schools' needs," for example, courts have 
focused on schools' institutional concerns and thereby accorded schools a 
deference that is out of conformity with how courts traditionally, and should, 
closely scrutinize assertions of institutional need to restrict fundamental rights. 
Intermediate scrutiny of speech restrictions in public schools, workplaces, and 
prisons--and perhaps in other institutions unique enough to warrant 
individualized treatment-seems a prudent compromise between recognizing 
that tailoring can yield relevant insights into institutional difference and 
recognizing that too much tailoring can yield unjustifiedly excessive 
deference to institutions seeking to restrict fundamental rights. 
168. Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, supra note 14, at 118. 
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